Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%2% Abstract% The%science%of%consciousness%has%made%great%strides%by%focusing%on% the% behavioral% and% neuronal% correlates% of% experience.% However,% correlates%are%not%enough%if%we%are%to%understand%even%basic%facts,%for% example,% why% the% cerebral% cortex% gives% rise% to% consciousness% but% the% cerebellum%does%not,%though%it%has%even%more%neurons%and%appears%to% be%just%as%complicated.%Moreover,%correlates%are%of%little%help%in%many% instances% where% we% would% like% to% know% if% consciousness% is% present:% patients% with% a% few% remaining% islands% of% functioning% cortex,% pre*term% infants,% non*mammalian% species,% and% machines% that% are% rapidly% outperforming% people% at% driving,% recognizing% faces% and% objects,% and% answering% difficult% questions.% To% address% these% issues,% we% need% not% only%more%data,%but%also%a%theory%of%consciousness%-%one%that%says%what% experience%is%and%what%type%of%physical%systems%can%have%it.%Integrated% Information%Theory%(IIT)%does%so%by%starting%from%conscious%experience% itself% via% five% phenomenological% axioms% of% existence,% composition,% information,% integration,% and% exclusion.% From% these% it% derives% five% postulates% about% the% properties% required% of% physical% mechanisms% to% support% consciousness.% The% theory% provides% a% principled% account% of% both%the%quantity%and%the%quality%of%an%individual%experience%(a%quale),% and% a% calculus% to% evaluate% whether% or% not% a% particular% system% of% mechanisms% is% conscious% and% of% what.% Moreover,% IIT% can% explain% a% range% of% clinical% and% laboratory% findings,% makes% a% number% of% testable% predictions,% and% extrapolates% to% a% number% of% unusual% conditions.% The% theory%vindicates%some%intuitions%often%associated%with%panpsychism%*% that% consciousness% is% an% intrinsic,% fundamental% property,% is% graded,% is% common% among% biological% organisms,% and% even% some% very% simple% systems%may%have%some%of%it.%However,%unlike%panpsychism,%IIT%implies% that%not%everything%is%conscious,%for%example%aggregates%such%as%heaps% of%sand,%a%group%of%individuals%or%feed*forward%networks.%Also,%in%sharp% contrast% with% widespread% functionalist% beliefs,% IIT% implies% that% digital% computers,%even%if%their%behavior%were%to%be%functionally%equivalent%to% ours,% and% even% if% they% were% to% run% faithful% simulations% of% the% human% brain,%would%experience%next%to%nothing.% Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%2% Consciousness:** Here,*There*and*Everywhere?* I%know%I%am%conscious:%I%am%seeing,%hearing,%feeling%something%here,% inside%my%own%head.%But%is%consciousness%-%subjective%experience%*%also% there,&not%only%in%other%people's%heads,%but%also%in%the%head%of%animals?% And%perhaps%everywhere,%pervading%the%cosmos,%as%in%old%panpsychist% traditions%and%in%the%Beatles'%song?%While%these%kinds%of%questions%may% seem% scientifically% inappropriate,% we% argue% below% that% they% can% be% approached% in% a% principled% and% testable% manner.% Moreover,% obtaining% an% answer% is% urgent,% not% only% because% of% difficult% clinical% cases% and% in% our%interactions%with%other%species,%but%also%because%of%the%advent%of% machines%that%are%getting%closer%to%passing%the%Turing%test%-%computers% programmed%to%perform%many%tasks%as%well%as%us,%and%often%far%better% than%some%brain*damaged%patients.%%% Here* That%I%am%conscious,%here%and%now,%is%the%one%fact%I%am%absolutely% certain%of%-%all%the%rest%is%conjecture.%This%is,%of%course,%the%gist%of%the% most%famous%deduction%in%Western%thought,%Descartes'%je&pense,&donc& je& suis.% Everything% else% -% what% I% think% I% know% about% my% body,% about% other% people,% dogs,% trees,% mountains,% and% stars,% is% inferential.% It% is% a% reasonable% inference,% corroborated% first% by% the% beliefs% of% my% fellow% humans% and% then% by% the% intersubjective% methods% of% science.% Yet% consciousness% itself% *% the% central% fact% of% existence% -% still% demands% a% rational%explanation.% The% past% two% centuries% of% clinical% and% laboratory% studies% have% revealed%an%intimate%relationship%between%the%conscious%mind%and%the% brain,% but% the% exact% nature% of% this% relationship% remains% elusive.% Why% does%the%brain%generate%consciousness%but%not%the%liver%or%the%heart,%as% previous% cultures% believed?% Why% certain% parts% of% the% brain% and% not% others?% Why% is% consciousness% lost% in% some% stages% of% sleep?% Why% does% red%feel%like%red%and%not%like%the%sound%of%a%violin?%Is%consciousness%just% an% epiphenomenon,% or% does% it% have% a% function?% Can% computers% be% conscious?% Could% a% system% behave% like% us% and% yet% be% devoid% of% consciousness%-%a%zombie?%Such%questions%seem%to%resist%the%empirical,% reductionist%approach%that%has%been%so%successful%for%other%aspects%of% the%natural%world.%Nevertheless,%thanks%to%experimental%and%theoretical% progress% in% the% past% decades% (Koch% 2004,% Baars% and% Gage% 2010,% Dehaene%and%Changeux%2011,%Boly,%Baars%et%al.%2013)% (Laureys,%Tononi% et% al.% 2009) ,% we% are% finally% in% a% better% position% to% understand% which% systems%under%which%conditions%can%give%rise%to%consciousness.%That%is,% the% study% of% consciousness% is% becoming% a% science.% In% doing% so,% it% is% leaving% behind% the% defeatist% dictum% of% the% physiologist% Emil% du% Bois* Reymond,% ignoramus& et& ignorabimus% (we% don't% know% and% never% will),% espousing% instead% the% upbeat% maxim% of% the% mathematician% David% Hilbert,%Wir&müssen&wissen&-&wir&werden&wissen%(we%must%know%and%we% will).% There* We% usually% grant% consciousness% to% others% *% of% the% same% kind% we% experience% in% the% privacy% of% our% own% mind% -% if% they% can% tell% us% what% they%feel,%or%if%they%look%and%behave%more%or%less%like%us.%However,%we% become% less% and% less% confident% in% attributing% consciousness% to% people% who% cannot% talk% about% their% experiences,% such% as% infants% and% young% children,%or%severely%brain%injured%patients.%Many%assume%that%animals% closely% related% to% homo& sapiens% -% apes% and% other% primates% -% are% conscious,%though%presumably%less%than%we%are,%based%on%the%similarity% of%their%behavior%and%their%brain.%But%should%we%attribute%experience%to% all%mammals, i %to%all%vertebrates,%to%invertebrates%such%as%cephalopods% and% bees,% or% even% to% all% multi*cellular% animals?% What% about% cultured% organoids%that%mimic%the%cellular%organization%of%the%developing%human% brain% (Lancaster,% Renner% et% al.% 2013) ?% And% finally,% what% about% the% sophisticated% machines% that% run% software% designed% to% substitute% for% conscious%humans%in%many%complicated%tasks?% Behavioral*correlates*of*consciousness*(BCC)*and*reportability* Traditionally,% we% assess% consciousness% by% observing% behavior% (Fig.%  1A) .%If%someone%is%awake%and%acts%meaningfully,%we%have%little%doubt%he% is% conscious.% If% he% speaks,% and% especially% if% he% can% answer% questions% about%what%he%is%conscious%of,%we%are%fully%confident.%In%the%laboratory,% the% ability% to% report% one's% experiences% has% become% the% gold% standard% for% judging% the% presence% of% consciousness.% Reportability% is% often% reduced%to%a%binary%forced%choice,%in%which%the%subject%only%pushes%one% of%two%buttons%for%"seen"%vs.%"not%seen,"%or%"angry"%vs.%"happy%face".% One% can% also% ask% how% confident% one% is% that% one% has% seen% something.% These% kinds% of% meta*cognitive% reports% can% also% be% obtained% from% trained%monkeys%or%other%animals,%with%so%many%similarities%to%our%own% reports% that% we% have% little% doubt% as% to% the% presence% of% consciousness% (Cowey%and%Stoerig%1995).%% But% behavior% can% be% misleading:% a% person% may% walk% and% speak% in% her%sleep,%yet%it%is%quite%dubious%whether%she%is%experiencing%anything.% Or%a%person%can%be%asleep,%immobile,%silent,%and%unresponsive,%yet%she% may% be% dreaming% *% vividly% conscious% of% an% imaginary% environment.% In% such% cases,% reportability% can% be% used% as% retrospective% evidence% of% consciousness,% by% waking% up% the% sleeper% to% obtain% a% "dream% report."% However,% reportability,% too,% can% be% problematic.% Since% we% obviously% experience%things%in%dreams%whether%or%not%we%are%woken%up%to%report% them,% we% should% accept% the% possibility% that% in% certain% situations% consciousness% can% be% present% even% if% it% cannot% be% reported% (Lamme% 2006 ,% Block% 2007 .% Moreover,% insisting% on% reportability% elevates% language%to%a%king*maker%role,%which%makes%inferring%consciousness%in% non*verbal% infants,% preterm% babies,% fetuses,% or% animals% problematic.
ii % Clearly,% if% we% want% to% understand% what% is% really% going% on,% we% must% investigate%the%brain%mechanisms%that%underlie%consciousness.% Neural*correlates*of*consciousness*(NCC)* The%NCC%have%been%defined%as%the%minimal%neural%mechanisms%that% are%jointly%sufficient%for%any%one%conscious%percept%( Fig.%1B ;%(Koch%and% Crick% 1990,% Crick% and% Koch% 1998,% Koch% and% Crick% 2000).% Every% experience% will% have% associated% NCC:% one% for% seeing% a% red% patch,% another%one%for%hearing%a%high%C.%Inducing%the%NCC%by%manipulating%the% relevant% neuronal% populations% via% magnetic% stimulation,% optogenetics% or%other%means%will%give%rise%to%the%associated%conscious%percept,%and% interfering%with%the%NCC%by%disabling%the%underlying%neural%circuits%will% eliminate%the%percept.%%% The% NCC% are% assessed% at% first% by% determining% which% aspects% of% neural%function%change%depending%on%whether%a%subject%is%conscious%or% not,% as% established% using% behavioral% reports.% This% can% be% done% by% considering% a% global% change% in% the% state% of% consciousness,% as% when% awareness%is%lost%during%deep%sleep%or%general%anesthesia%(Tononi%and% Laureys%2009).%%Or%it%can%be%done%by%considering%changes%in%a%particular% content%of%consciousness,%as%when%a%subject's%awareness%of%a%particular% stimulus% is% experimentally% manipulated% ("seen"% vs.% "not% seen").% In% optimally% controlled% experiments,% the% stimulus% and% the% behavioral% report% (such% as% a% button% press)% are% kept% constant% while% the% subject% sometimes%sees%the%percept%and%sometimes%does%not%(Logothetis%1998,% Dehaene% and% Changeux% 2011,% Mudrik% and% Koch% 2013).% Once% a% particular% NCC% has% been% sufficiently% validated,% it% can% be% used% to% extrapolate% to% situations% where% reports% are% not% available.% Both% functional%brain%imaging%in%magnetic%scanners%as%well%as%large*scale%EEG% recordings%from%outside%the%skull%have%been%put%to%use%to%track%down% the%footprints%of%consciousness%in%the%brain%of%healthy%adult%observers.% Popular% candidates% include% strong% activation% of% higher*order% fronto* parietal% cortices% (Fig.% 1B) ,% high*frequency% electrical% activity% in% the% gamma%range%(35*80%Hz),%and%the%occurrence%of%an%EEG%event%known%as% Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%3% the% P300% wave% (Tononi% and% Laureys% 2009,% Dehaene% and% Changeux% 2011).% However,% there% is% still% no% consensus% on% whether% any% of% these% signs% can% be% treated% as% reliable% "signatures"% of% consciousness.% In% particular,% there% can% be% consciousness% without% frontal% cortex% involvement% (Mataró,% Jurado% et% al.% 2001 ,% Goldberg,% Harel% et% al.% 2006 ,% Frässle,% Sommer% et% al.% 2014 ,% gamma% activity% without% consciousness(Engel%and%Singer%2001),%such%as%during%anesthesia% (Imas,% Ropella% et% al.% 2005 ,% Murphy,% Bruno% et% al.% 2011 ,% and% consciousness% without% a% frontal% P300,% for% example% during% dreaming% sleep% (Cote,% Etienne%et%al.%2001,%Takahara,%Nittono%et%al.%2002).%Moreover,%it%is%likely% that%many%of%the%signatures%proposed%as%possible%NCC%may%actually%be% correlates% of% neural% activity% that% is% needed% leading% up% to% a% conscious% percept% (Aru,%Axmacher%et%al.%2012,%Pitts,%Martínez%et%al.%2012) ,%or%for% giving% a% report% following% a% conscious% percept% (Goldberg,% Harel% et% al.% 2006 ,% Pitts,% Martínez% et% al.% 2012 ,% Frässle,% Sommer% et% al.% 2014 ,% rather% than% for% having% an% experience.% Finally,% NCC% obtained% in% healthy% adults% may%or%may%not%apply%to%brain%damaged%patients,%to%infants,%to%animals% very%different%from%us,%and%certainly%not%to%machines% (Fig.%2) .% Patients*and*infants* Patients% with% widespread% cortical% or% thalamic% damage% pose% a% poignant% challenge.% Emergency% room% personnel% quickly% evaluate% the% severity% of% a% head% injury% behaviorally% by% assigning% a% number% to% a% patient's% auditory,% visual,% verbal% and% motor% functions% as% well% as% communication%and%arousal%level.%Various%NCC,%such%as%the%presence%of% a% P300% wave% in% response% to% a% non*standard% stimulus,% are% increasingly% being%used%to%complement%the%behavioral%assessment%and%occasionally% modify% the% diagnosis.% In% some% cases,% NCC% can% be% decisive.% Thus,% if% a% patient% who% lies% mute% and% immobile% can,% however,% respond% to% commands% by% appropriately% activating% certain% brain% areas,% it% is% fair% to% conclude% that% she% is% conscious% (Owen,% Coleman% et% al.% 2006) .% Yet% even% the% NCC% may% be% ambiguous.% For% example,% the% P300% wave% is% absent% in% many% minimally% conscious% patients% and% even% in% some% brain*damaged% patients%who%can%communicate% (King,%Sitt%et%al.%2013) .%And%what%should% one% make% of% patients% in% whom,% amidst% widespread% destruction% and% inactivity,% one% or% a% few% isolated% cortical% areas% may% show% signs% of% metabolic% activation% and% of% electrophysiological% "markers"% of% consciousness% (Schiff,% Ribary% et% al.% 2002) ?% Is% an% island% of% functioning% brain% tissue% sufficient% for% generating% a% limited% kind% of% awareness,% maybe%just%awareness%of%sound%or%of%pain?%In%other%words,%"what%is%it% like"% to% be% a% brain% island,% if% it% feels% like% anything% at% all?% And% how% big% must%the%island%be%to%qualify?%* By% the% same% token,% what% is% it% like% to% be% a% newborn% baby% with% an% immature% brain% and% restricted% connectivity% among% cortical% structures% (Lagercrantz% and% Changeux% 2009)?% Again,% considering% NCC% can% be% helpful:% for% example,% a% wave% resembling% the% P300% wave% has% been% reported%in%6%to%16%months%old%infants,%although%weaker,%more%variable% and%delayed%than%in%adults% (Kouider,%Stahlhut%et%al.%2013) .%But%does%this% mean% that% newborn% and% pre*term% babies% or% even% fetuses% experience% nothing%because%they%do%not%show%a%P300?% Animals* The% problem% becomes% even% more% acute% when% turning% to% other% species.% The% study% of% consciousness% in% nature% has% been% hindered% for% centuries%by%a%strong%belief%in%human%exceptionalism.%Yet%the%range%and% complexity%of%animal%behavior%has%laid%rest%to%this%belief,%at%least%among% biologists.%This%is%particularly%true%for%mammals.%In%psychophysical%tasks% involving% simple% button% presses,% trained% macaque% monkeys% act% very% similar% to% human% volunteers,% including% signaling% when% they% don't% see% anything% (Cowey% and% Stoerig% 1995).% Visual% recognition% of% self,% meta* cognition% (knowing% one's% mind),% theory% of% mind,% empathy% and% long* range% planning% have% all% been% demonstrated% in% primates,% rodents% and% other%orders%(Smith,%Couchman%et%al.).%% It% is% also% difficult% to% find% anything% exceptional% about% the% human% brain% (Hawrylycz,% Lein% et% al.% 2012) .% Its% constitutive% genes,% synapses,% neurons% and% other% cells% are% similar% to% those% found% in% many% other% species.% Even% its% size% is% not% so% special,% as% elephants,% dolphins% and% whales% have% even% bigger% brains% (Herculano*Houzel% 2012).% Only% an% expert%neuroanatomist,%armed%with%a%microscope,%can%tell%a%grain*sized% piece% of% neocortex% of% a% mouse% from% that% of% a% monkey% or% a% human.% Biologists% emphasize% this% structural% and% behavioral% continuity% by% distinguishing%between%non:human&and%human&animals%(Huxley%1872).% Given%this%continuity,%it%seems%unjustified%to%claim%that%only%one%species% has% consciousness% while% everybody% else% is% devoid% of% experience,% is% a% zombie.% It% is% far% more% likely% that% all% mammals% have% at% least% some% conscious%experiences,%can%hear%the%sounds%and%see%the%sights%of%life.%%% As%we%consider%species%that%are%progressively%further%removed%from% homo& sapiens% in% evolutionary% and% neuronal% terms,% the% case% for% consciousness%becomes%more%difficult%to%make.%Two%observations,%one% relating%to%complexity%of%behavior%and%another%one%to%complexity%of%the% underlying% nervous% system,% are% critical.% First,% ravens,% crows,% magpies,% parrots% and% other% birds,% tuna,% coelacanths% and% other% fish,% octopuses% and% other% cephalopods,% bees% and% other% members% of% the% vast% class% of% insects% are% all% capable% of% sophisticated,% learnt,% non*stereotyped% behaviors%that%we%associate%with%consciousness%if%carried%out%by%people% (Dawkins% 1998,% Griffin% 2001,% Edelman% and% Seth% 2009).% Darwin% himself% set%out%"to%learn%how%far%the%worms%acted%consciously"%and%concluded% that% there% was% no% absolute% threshold% between% "lower"% and% "higher"% animals,% including% humans,% which% would% assign% higher% mental% powers% to% one% but% not% to% the% other% (Darwin% 1887).% Second,% the% nervous% systems% of% any% of% these% creatures% display% a% vast% and% ill*understood% complexity.% The% bee% contains% about% 800,000% nerve% cells% whose% morphological% and% electrical% heterogeneity% rivals% that% of% any% neocortical% neuron.% These% cells% are% assembled% in% highly% nonlinear% feedback%circuits%whose%density%is%up%to%ten%times%higher%than%that%of% neocortex% (Koch% and% Laurent% 1999).% Thus,% it% is% unlikely% that% neural% signatures% of% consciousness% that% have% some% validity% in% humans% and% other%mammals%will%apply%to%invertebrates.%% On%the%other%hand,%the%lessons%learnt%from%studying%the%behavioral% and% neuronal% correlates% of% consciousness% in% people% must% make% us% cautious% about% inferring% its% presence% in% creatures% very% different% from% us,% no% matter% how% sophisticated% their% behavior% and% how% complicated% their% brain.% Humans% can% perform% seemingly% sophisticated% behaviors% *% recognizing% whether% a% scene% is% congruous% or% incongruous,% controlling% the% size,% orientation,% and% strength% of% how% one's% finger% should% grip% an% object,% doing% simple% arithmetic,% detecting% the% meaning% of% words,% or% rapid%keyboard%typing%-%in%a%seemingly%non*conscious%manner%(Hassin,% Uleman% et% al.% 2005,% Kouider% and% Dehaene% 2007,% Berlin% 2011,% Mudrik,% Breska% et% al.% 2011,% Sklar,% Levy% et% al.% 2012,% Hassin% 2013).% When% a% bee% navigates% a% maze,% does% it% do% so% like% when% we% consciously% deliberate% whether% to% turn% right% or% left,% or% rather% like% when% we% type% on% a% keyboard?% Similarly,% consider% that% an% extraordinarily% complicated% neuronal%structure%in%our%brain,%the%cerebellum,%home%to%69%of%the%86% billion% nerve% cells% that% make% up% the% human% brain% (Herculano*Houzel% 2012),%apparently%has%little%to%do%with%consciousness.%Patients%that%lose% part% or% nearly% all% of% their% cerebellum% due% to% stroke% or% other% trauma% show% ataxia,% slurred% speech,% and% unsteady% gait% (Lemon% and% Edgley% 2010)%but%do%not%complain%of%a%no%loss%or%diminution%of%consciousness.% Is% the% bee's% brain% central% complex% more% like% the% cerebellum% or% more% like%the%cerebral%cortex%with%respect%to%experience?%Thus,%the%extent%to% which% non*mammalian% species% share% with% us% the% gift% of% subjective% experience%remains%hard%to%fathom.
iii % Machines* Difficulties% in% attributing% sentience% become% even% more% apparent% when% considering% digital% computers.% These% have% a% radically% different% architecture% and% provenance% than% biological% creatures% shaped% by% Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%4% natural%selection.%Due%to%the%relentless%decrease%in%transistor%size%over% the% past% 50% years% and% the% concomitant% exponential% increase% in% computational% power% and% memory% capacity,% present*day% computers% executing% appropriate% algorithms% outperform% us% in% many% tasks% that% were%thought%to%be%the%sole%prerogative%of%the%human%mind.%Prominent% examples% include% IBM's% Deep% Blue% that% beat% the% reigning% chess% world% master%in%1997;%another%IBM%computer,%Watson,%capable%of%answering% questions%posed%in%spoken%English%that%won%the%quiz%show%Jeopardy&in% 2011;% smart% phones% that% answer% questions% by% speech;% Google's% driverless% cars% that% have% logged% more% than% half% a% million% km% on% open% roads;%and%machine%vision%algorithms%for%face%detection%in%security%and% commercial% applications% (Kurzweil% 2012).% People% playing% chess,% supplying% a% meaningful% answer% to% a% given% question,% driving% a% car% or% picking%out%a%face%are%assumed%to%be%conscious.%But%should%we%say%the% same%for%these%digital%creatures?%% Integrated*Information*Theory*(IIT)* Clearly,% as% we% move% away% from% people,% BCC% and% NCC% become% progressively% less% helpful% to% establish% the% presence% of% consciousness.% Also,%even%in%the%normal%human%brain,%we%need%to%understand%why%and% how% certain% structures% give% rise% to% experience% (the% cerebral% cortex),% while%others%do%not%(the%cerebellum),%and%why%they%do%so%under%certain% conditions%(wake,%dreams)%and%not%others%(deep%sleep,%seizures).%Some% philosophers%have%claimed%that%the%problem%of%explaining%how%matter% can% give% rise% to% consciousness% may% forever% elude% us,% dubbing% it% the% Hard&Problem% (Chalmers%1996,%Block,%Flanagan%et%al.%1997,%Shear%1999) .% Indeed,% as% long% as% one% starts% from% the% brain% and% asks% how% it% could% possibly%give%rise%to%experience%-%in%effect%trying%to%"distill"%mind%out%of% matter%(Mcginn%2000),%the%problem&may%indeed%remain%not%only%hard,% but% outright% impossible% to% solve.% But% things% may% be% less% hard% if% one% takes% the% opposite% approach:% start% from% consciousness% itself,% by% identifying%its%essential%properties,%and%then%ask%what%kinds%of%physical% mechanisms% could% possibly% account% for% them.% This% is% the% approach% taken% by% Integrated% Information% Theory% (IIT)% (Tononi% 2004,% Tononi% 2008,% Tononi% 2012),% an% evolving% framework% that% provides% a% principled% account% for% what% it% takes% for% consciousness% to% arise,% offers% a% parsimonious% explanation% for% the% empirical% evidence,% makes% testable% predictions,%and%permits%inferences%and%extrapolations. iv % Axioms:*Essential*phenomenological*properties*of*consciousness* Taking% consciousness% as% primary,% IIT% first% identifies% axioms% of% experience% (Fig.%3,%left) ,%then%derives%a%set%of%corresponding%postulates% (Fig.%3 ,%right)%about%the%nature%of%the%underlying%physical%mechanisms% (Tononi% 2012,% Oizumi,% Albantakis% et% al.% 2014).% The% axioms% of% IIT% are% truths%about%our%own%experience%that%are%assumed%to%be%self*evident.% They% include% existence,% composition,% information,% integration,% and% exclusion.% Existence.%Consciousness%exists:%my%experience%just%is%-%indeed,%that% my%experience%here%and%now%exists,%is%the%only%fact%I%can%be%absolutely% sure% of.% Moreover,% my% experience% exists% from% its% own% intrinsic% perspective,%independent%of%external%observers.% Composition.% Consciousness% is% structured:% each% experience% is% composed% of% many% phenomenological& distinctions.% Within% the% same% experience,% I% can% see,% for% example,% left% and% right,% red% and% blue,% a% triangle%and%a%square,%a%red%triangle%on%the%left,%and%so%on.% Information.% Consciousness% is% differentiated:% at% any% moment% in% time,% each% experience% is& the& specific& way& it& is& (a% specific% set% of% phenomenological%distinctions),%differing%in%its%specific%way%from%other% possible%experiences.%Thus,%an%experience%of%pure%darkness%and%silence% is%what%it%is%because,%among%other%things,%it%is%not%filled%with%light%and% sound,% color% and% shapes,% and% so% on.% Consider% all% the% frames% of% all% possible% movies:% these% are% but% a% small% subset% of% all% possible% experiences.% Integration.%Consciousness%is%unified:%each%experience%is%irreducible& to%non*interdependent%components.%Thus,%I%experience%a%whole%visual% scene,%not%the%left%side%of%the%visual%field%independent%of%the%right%side% (and% vice% versa).% For% example,% the% experience% of% seeing% the% word% "HONEYMOON"%written%in%the%middle%of%a%blank%page%is%irreducible%to% an% experience% of% seeing% "HONEY"% on% the% left% plus% the% experience% of% seeing%"MOON"%on%the%right.%What%I%see%is%the%whole%"HONEYMOON."% Similarly,% seeing% a% red% triangle% is% irreducible% to% seeing% a% grey% triangle% plus%the%disembodied%color%red.% Exclusion.% Consciousness% is% singular,% in% content,% and% spatio* temporal%grain:%there%is%no&superposition&of%multiple%experiences,%with% less%or%more%content,%flowing%at%once%at%faster%or%slower%speeds.%Thus,% in%addition%to%the%experience%I%have%right%now,%say,%of%being%in%my%room% and% seeing% my% legs% on% the% bed,% there% are% no% further% superimposed% experiences% with% either% less% content% -% say,% one% lacking% the% color% or% another% one% lacking% the% left% side% of% the% visual% field% *% or% with% more% content%*%say,%one%that%also%includes%awareness%of%the%alarm%bell%that%is% ringing%but%I%am%not%hearing%it%(because%I%am%actually%in%the%middle%of%a% dream).% Similarly,% my% experience% flows% at% a% particular% speed% -% each% experience%encompassing%say%a%hundred%milliseconds%or%so%*%and%there% are%no%superimposed%experiences%that%flow%at%faster%speeds%(say,%each% experience% encompassing% just% one% microsecond),% or% at% slower% speeds% (say,%each%experience%encompassing%an%entire%hour).%%
Postulates:* Properties* that* physical* mechanisms* must* have* to* support*consciousness* To% parallel% these% axioms% that% capture% the% essential% properties% of% every% experience,% IIT% proposes% a% set% of% postulates% concerning% the% requirements%that%must%be%satisfied%by%physical%systems%to%account%for% experience% (Fig.%3,%right) .% Existence.%Experience%is%generated%by%a&system&of&mechanisms&in&a& state:% To% exist% from% its% own% intrinsic& perspective,% independent% of% external%observers,%a%system%must%have%cause:effect&power&upon%itself:% its%mechanisms%must%be%able%to%"make%a%difference"%to%the%probability% of%its%past*future%states% (Fig.%3 ,%Existence)%(Bateson%1972).%Cause*effect% power% is% a% precondition% for% something% to% exist:% there% is% no% point% in% assuming%that%something%exists%if%nothing%can%make%a%difference%to%it,% or%if%it%cannot%make%a%difference%to%anything%(Alexander's&dictum). v %To% pick% up% differences% and% make% a% difference,% physical% mechanisms% must% have% two% or% more% internal% states,% inputs% that% can% influence% these% states,% and% outputs% that% depend% on% these% states.% Examples% of% such% mechanisms% include% neurons% and% logic% gates% made% of% transistors.% Moreover,%to%generate%experience,%a%system%of%mechanisms%must%have% cause*effect% power% within% itself,% i.e.% intrinsically,% independent% of% extrinsic%causes%and%effects. vi %% Composition.% The% system% can% be% structured:% elementary% mechanisms%can%be%composed&to%specify%various%"differences%that%make% a% difference"% to% the% system% (affect% the% probability% of% its% past*future% states).% Thus,% if% a% system% is% composed% of% elements% A,% B,% and% C% (Fig.% 3 ,% Composition),%any%subset%of%elements,%including%A,%B,%C;%AB,%AC,%BC;%as% well% as% the% entire% system,% ABC,% can% constitute% a% mechanism% having% cause*effect% power.% Composition% thus% allows% for% elementary% mechanisms% to% form% distinct% higher*order% mechanisms% (as% long% as% a% higher*order%mechanism%has%causes%and%effects%that%cannot%be%reduced% to%those%of%its%constituting%elementary%mechanism,%see%below).% Information.% A% system% of% mechanisms% in% a% state% specifies% a% differentiated%conceptual%structure:%each%structure%is%the&specific&way&it& is&(a%specific%composition%of%concepts),%differing%in%its%specific%way%from% other% possible% ones.% A% conceptual& structure& is% the% set% of% concepts% specified% by% the% mechanisms% of% a% system% in% various% compositions.% A% concept% is% how% each% mechanism% within% the% system% specifies% the% probability%of%past*future%states%of%the%system%(cause:effect&repertoire).% Consider%for%example,%within%the%system%ABC% (Fig.%3,%Information) ,%the% mechanism%implemented%by%element%C,%an%XOR%gate%with%two%inputs%(A% Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%5% and%B)%and%two%outputs%(the%AND%gate%B%and%the%OR%gate%A).%If%C%is%OFF,% its%cause%repertoire%specifies%that,%the%previous%time%step,%A%and%B%must% have% been% either% in% the% state% ON,OFF% or% in% the% state% OFF,ON,% rather% than%in%the%other%two%possible%states%(ON,ON;%OFF,OFF);%and%its%effect% repertoire%specifies%that%the%next%time%step%B%will%have%to%be%OFF,%rather% than% ON.% Thus,% the% cause*effect% repertoire% specifies% the% cause*effect% power% of% a% mechanism% in% a% particular% state,% and% the% conceptual% structure%specifies%the%cause*effect%power%of%a%system%of%mechanisms.% Note%that%the%notion%of%information%in%IIT%differs%substantially%from%that% in%communication%theory%or%in%common%language,%but%it%is%faithful%to%its% etymology:% information% refers% to% how% a% system% of% mechanisms% in% a% state,%through%its%cause*effect%power,%gives%rise%to%a%form%("informs"%a% conceptual%structure)%in%the%space%of%possibilities.% Integration.% The% conceptual% structure% specified% by% the% system% is% unified:% it% is% irreducible% to% that% specified% by% non*interdependent% sub* systems.%Irreducibility%can%be%measured%as%integrated%information%(big% phi%or%Φ,%a%non*negative%number),%which%quantifies%to%what%extent%the% conceptual%structure%specified%by%a%system's%mechanisms%changes%if%the% system%is%partitioned%(cut%or%reduced)%along%its%minimum%partition%(the% one%that%makes%the%least%difference).%For%example,%the%system%in%Fig.%3% is% integrated,% because% partitioning% it% through% its% weakest% link% destroys% several% cause*effect% repertoires% and% changes% others% (compare% the% conceptual% structure% under% "information"% and% under% "integration"% in% Fig.%3 ).%By%contrast,%if%a%system%of%mechanisms%can%be%divided%into%two% sub*systems% and% the% partition% makes% no% difference% to% the% associated% conceptual%structure,%then%the%whole%is%reducible%to%those%parts.%Being% irreducible% is% another% precondition% for% existence% having% to% do% with% causation:%there%is%no%point%in%assuming%that%the%whole%exists%in%and%of% itself,% if% it% has% no% causal% power% above% and% beyond% its% parts.% This% postulate% also% applies% to% individual% mechanisms:% a% subset% of% elements% can% contribute% a% specific% aspect% of% experience% only% if% its% cause*effect% repertoire%within%the%system%is%irreducible%by%the%minimum%partition%of% the%mechanism%(small%phi%or%ϕ).% Exclusion.% The% conceptual% structure% specified% by% the% system% must% be%singular:%%the%one%that%is%maximally&irreducible&(Φ max ).%That%is,%there% can% be% no& superposition& of% conceptual% structures% over% elements% and% spatio*temporal% grain.% The% system% of% mechanisms% that% generates% a% maximally& irreducible% conceptual& structure% is% called% a% complex.
vii % For% example,% in% Fig.% 3% (Exclusion),% there% cannot% exist% complex% ABC,% and% complex% AB,% AC,% and% BC% simultaneously,% because% complexes% cannot% overlap.% Again,% exclusion% makes% sense% with% respect% to% causation,% because% it% avoids% multiple% causation:% if% a% mechanism% specifies% a% particular% cause*effect% repertoire% within% one% complex,% it% cannot% additionally% specify% an% overlapping% cause*effect% repertoire% as% part% of% other,%overlapping%complexes,%because%we%would%be%counting%multiple% times%the%difference%that%mechanism%makes.%This%postulate%also%applies% to%individual%mechanisms%in%a%complex:%a%subset%of%elements%in%a%state% can% contribute% only% one% aspect% to% experience% *% the% cause*effect% repertoire%within%the%system%that%is%maximally%irreducible%(ϕ max ),%called% a% core% concept.% Finally,% this% postulate% also% applies% to% spatio*temporal% grain.%For%example,%a%mechanism%cannot%have%effects%at%a%fine%temporal% grain,% and% additional% effects% at% a% coarser% grain,% otherwise% causal% exclusion% would% be% violated.% On% the% other% hand,% if% the% effects% at% a% coarser%grain%are%more%irreducible%than%those%at%a%finer%grain,%then%the% coarser%grain%of%causation%excludes%the%finer%one% (Hoel,%Albantakis%et%al.% 2013) .% viii % The* central* identity:* Experience* as* a* maximally* irreducible* conceptual*structure* Altogether,% the% elements% of% a% complex% in% a% state,% combined% in% irreducible%mechanisms%that%specify%concepts%within%the%complex,%form% a%maximally&irreducible&conceptual&structure,%also%known%as%a%quale.%A% quale%exists%in%a%space%called%qualia%space,%whose%axes%are%given%by%all% possible%past%and%future%states%of%the%complex.%Every%concept%is%a%point% in%the%space,%which%specifies%the%probability%of%past%and%future%states%of% the% system,% given% the% state% of% a% particular% mechanism% within% it.% The% constellation% of% all% concepts% together% constitutes% the% "shape"% of% the% quale%(Fig%4).%This%leads%to%the%central%identity%of%IIT,%which%states%that%a% conscious%experience%is%identical%to%a%maximally%irreducible%conceptual% structure:% the% quale% completely% specifies% both% its% quality% (the% set% of% concepts%in%the%quale%is%the%content%of%consciousness)%and%its%quantity% (the% value% of% irreducibility% Φ max % of% the% quale% is% the% level% of% consciousness).%If%a%system%has%Φ max %=%0,%what%it%can%do%as%a%system%is% completely%reducible%to%what%its%parts%can%do,%so%it%cannot%lay%claim%to% existing.%If%Φ max %is%large,%the%system%can%do%much%more%than%its%parts,% so%it%exits%in%and%of%itself.%More%generally,%the%larger%Φ max ,%the%more%a% system% can% lay% claim% to% existing,% in% a% fuller% sense% than% lower% Φ max % systems.% Just% how& much% the% system% exists% as% such% is% measured% by% its% Φ max % value,% while% which& way% it% exists% is% specified% by% its% concepts% (irreducible%cause*effect%repertoires).%According%to%IIT,%the%quantity%and% quality% of% an% experience% are% an% intrinsic% property% of% a% complex% of% mechanisms% in% a% state% -% the% property% of% shaping% the% space% of% possibilities% (past% and% future% states)% in% a% particular% way,% just% as% it% is% intrinsic%to%a%mass%to%bend%space*time%around%it. ix % At% any% given% time,% then,% consciousness% is% supported% by% a% set% of% neuronal%mechanisms%forming%a%complex%of%high%Φ max %that%specifies%a% maximally% irreducible% conceptual% structure.% The% particular% set% of% neurons%that%form%the%main%complex%in%our%brain%may%change%to%some% extent%from%moment%to%moment,%as%well%as%their%state%-%which%neurons% are% firing% and% which% are% not.% For% example,% let% us% assume% that% while% I% watch%a%scene%of%a%movie%containing%the%actress%Jennifer%Aniston%(JA),% the% main% complex% in% my% brain% is% made% up% of% neurons% within% certain% parts% of% the% cerebral% cortex.
x % Every% neuron% within% the% complex% necessarily% shapes% the%probability% of% possible% past% states% (causes)% and% future% states% (effects)% of% the% complex,% depending% on% how% it% is% connected%to%the%other%neurons%and%on%its%state%(say%firing%strongly%for% 100% msec).% Thus,% a% neuron% firing% strongly% in% a% certain% visual% area% may% specify% as% more% likely% those% past% states% of% the% complex% that% are% compatible% with% the% invariant% concept% "J.A.'s% face,"% as% well% as% certain% appropriate% future% states.% Another% neuron% firing% strongly% in% another% visual% area% may% specify% that% there% likely% was% a% horizontal% edge% in% a% certain% position% of% the% visual% field,% and% so% on.% Yet% other% neurons% that% are%part%of%the%complex%but%are%silent%may%specify%that%certain%past%(and% future)%states%are%unlikely%to%have%occurred%(or%to%occur),%such%as%those% having%to%do%with%the%invariant%concepts%"book,"%"square",%and%so%on.% Moreover,%combinations%of%neurons%may%specify%higher*order%concepts,% such%as%"J.A.%with%a%red%hat%sitting%on%the%couch%on%the%left."%Note%that% all% the% concepts% are% generated% by% elements% of% the% complex,% specify% cause*effect% repertoires% over% elements% of% the% complex,% and% acquire% meaning%intrinsically,%in%relation%to%the%other%concepts%in%the%quale,%and% not% by% referring% to% external% inputs% (J.A.% is% just% as% meaningful% when% daydreaming%about%her,%or%in%a%dream)%(Oizumi,%Albantakis%et%al.%2014).% In% principle,% then,% the% postulates% of% IIT% offer% a% way% to% analyze% any% system% of% mechanisms% in% a% particular% state% and% determine% whether% it% constitutes% a% complex,% over% which% spatial% and% temporal% grain, xi % and% which% quale% it% generates.% Furthermore,% while% in% practice% it% is% not% possible% to% determine% the% quale% and% Φ max % precisely% for% a% realistic% system,%it%is%already%possible%to%employ%IIT%for%prediction,%explanation,% and%extrapolation.% Predictions* A%straightforward%experimental%prediction%of%IIT%is%that%the%loss%and% recovery% of% consciousness% should% be% associated% with% the% breakdown% and% recovery% of% the% brain's% capacity% for% information% integration.% This% prediction%has%been%confirmed%using%transcranial%magnetic%stimulation% Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%6% (TMS)% in% combination% with% high*density% electroencephalography% in% conditions%characterized%by%loss%of%consciousness% (Massimini,%Ferrarelli% et% al.% 2005 ,% Casali,% Gosseries% et% al.% 2013 .% These% include% deep% sleep,% general% anesthesia% obtained% with% several% different% agents,% and% brain% damaged% patients% (vegetative,% minimally% conscious,% emerging% from% minimal% consciousness,% locked*in).% If% a% subject% is% conscious% when% the% cerebral% cortex% is% probed% with% a% pulse% of% current% induced% by% the% TMS% coil%from%outside%the%skull,%the%cortex%responds%with%a%complex%pattern% of%reverberating%activations%and%deactivations%that%is%both%widespread% (integrated)% and% differentiated% in% time% and% space% (information% rich)% (Massimini,% Ferrarelli% et% al.% 2005) .% By% contrast,% when% consciousness% fades,%the%response%of%the%cortex%becomes%local%(loss%of%integration)%or% global% but% stereotypical% (loss% of% information).% The% perturbational& complexity& index% (PCI),% a% scalar% measure% of% the% compressibility% of% the% EEG% response% to% TMS% inspired% by% IIT,% decreases% distinctly% in% all% the% different%conditions%of%loss%of%consciousness%and,%critical%for%a%clinically% useful% device,% so% far% has% done% so% in% each% individual% healthy% subject%or% neurological%patient%tested% (Casali,%Gosseries%et%al.%2013) .% Some%examples%of%counterintuitive%predictions%of%IIT%are%also%worth% pointing% out.% One% is% that% a% system% such% as% the% cerebral% cortex% may% generate% experience% even% if% it% is% nearly% silent,% a% state% that% is% perhaps% approximated%through%certain%meditative%practices%that%aim%at%reaching% "pure"% awareness% without% content% (Sullivan% 1995,% Blackmore% 2011).% This% corollary% of% IIT% contrasts% with% the% common% assumption% that% neurons% only% contribute% to% consciousness% if% they% are% active% in% such% a% way% that% they% "signal"% or% "broadcast"% the% information% they% represent% and% "ignite"% fronto*parietal% networks% (Dehaene% and% Changeux% 2011).% That% silent% neurons% can% contribute% to% consciousness% is% because,% in% IIT,% information%is%not%in%the%message%that%is%broadcast%by%an%element,%but% in%the%shape%of%the%conceptual%structure%that%is%specified%by%a%complex.% Inactive% elements% of% a% complex% can% affect% the% probability% of% possible% past%and%future%states%as%much%as%active%ones%can%(the%dog%that%did%not% bark% in% the% famous% Sherlock% Holmes% story).% Conversely,% if% the% same% neurons% were% not% silent,% but% pharmacologically% or% optogenetically% turned% off% (inactivated),% they% would% cease% to% contribute% to% consciousness:%even%though%their%actual%state%is%the%same,%they%would% lack%a%cause*effect%repertoire%and%thus%would%not%be%able%to%affect%the% probability%of%possible%past%and%future%states%of%the%complex.%% Another%prediction%is%that,%if%the%efficacy%of%the%200%million%callosal% fibers%through%which%the%two%cerebral%hemispheres%communicate%with% each% other% were% reduced% progressively,% there% would% be% a% moment% at% which,%for%a%minimal%change%in%the%traffic%of%neural%impulses%across%the% callosum,% there% would% be% an% all*or*none% change% in% consciousness:% experience%would%go%from%being%a%single%one%to%suddenly%splitting%into% two% separate% experiencing% minds% (one% linguistically% dominant),% as% we% know% to% be% the% case% with% split*brain% patients% (Gazzaniga% 2005).% This% would%be%the%point%at%which%Φ max %for%the%whole%brain%would%fall%below% the% value% of% Φ max % for% the% left% and% for% the% right% hemisphere% taken% by% themselves.% Explanations* IIT% offers% a% coherent,% principled% account% for% many% disparate% facts% about% the% NCC.% For% example,% why% is% consciousness% generated% by% the% cerebral%cortex%(or%at%least%some%parts%of%it),%but%not%by%the%cerebellum,% despite%the%latter%having%even%more%neurons?%Why%does%consciousness% fade% early% in% sleep,% although% the% brain% remains% active?% Why% is% it% lost% during% generalized% seizures,% when% neural% activity% is% intense% and% synchronous?% Why% is% there% no% direct% contribution% to% consciousness% from% neural% activity% within% sensory% pathways% (the% retina)% and% motor% pathways%(the%motoneurons%in%the%spinal%cord),%or%within%neural%circuits% looping%out%of%the%cortex%into%subcortical%structures%and%back,%despite% their%manifest%ability%to%influence%the%content%of%experience?% These%and%other%well*known%facts%find%a%parsimonious%explanation% based% on% the% postulates% of% IIT.% Thus,% a% prominent% feature% of% the% cerebral%cortex,%responsible%for%the%content%of%consciousness,%is%that%it% is% comprised% of% elements% that% are% functionally% specialized% and% at% the% same% time% can% interact% rapidly% and% effectively.% This% is% the% kind% of% organization% that% yields% a% comparatively% high% value% of% Φ max .% Instead,% the% cerebellum% is% composed% of% small% sheet*like% modules% that% process% inputs%and%produce%outputs%largely%independent%of%each%other% (Cohen% 1998 ,% Bower% 2002 .% Simulations% also% show% that% input% and% output% pathways,% while% capable% of% affecting% the% main% complex% and% being% affected%by%it,%can%remain%excluded%from%it,%because%they%are%not%part% of% a% local% maximum% of% integrated% information.% The% same% applies% to% loops%that%may%exit%the%main%complex%and%reenter%it.%Other%simulations% show%that%Φ max% is%low%when%the%effective%connectivity%among%a%set%of% elements% is% weak% or% is% organized% in% homogeneous% manner.% Indeed,% as% was% mentioned% above,% when% consciousness% fades% during% deep% slow% wave% sleep% or% in% certain% states% of% general% anesthesia,% the% interactions% among% different% cortical% regions% become% weaker% and% highly% stereotypical,%as%they%do%during%generalized%epileptic%seizures.% Extrapolations* Finally,%the%more%the%postulates%of%IIT%are%validated%in%situations%in% which% we% are% reasonably% confident% about% if% and% how% consciousness% changes,% the% more% we% can% use% the% theory% to% extrapolate% and% make% inferences% about% situations% where% we% are% less% confident% -% brain* damaged% patients,% newborn% babies,% alien% animals,% complicated% machines,%and%other%far*fetched%scenarios,%as%we%shall%consider%next.% Everywhere?* In%the%"Canticle%of%the%Creatures,"%Saint%Francis%addressed%animals,% flowers,%and%even%stones%as%if%endowed%with%soul%(psyche),%and%praised% God% for% all% His% creatures:% mother% earth,% brother% sun,% sister% moon,% the% stars,% the% air,% water,% and% fire.% And% he% was% not% alone.% Some% of% the% brightest% minds% in% the% West% embraced% some% form% of% the% ancient% philosophical% doctrine% of% panpsychism,% starting% with% the% Presocratics% and% Plato.% The% Renaissance% philosophers% Patrizi,% Bruno,% Telesio,% and% Campanella%took%the%position%that%matter%and%soul%are%one%substance.% Later,% Spinoza,% Leibniz,% Schopenhauer% and,% closer% to% modern% times,% James,% Whitehead,% Russell,% and% Teilhard% de% Chardin% espoused% panpsychist% notions% (Skrbina% 2009,% Chalmers% 2013).% Strawson% (2006)% (Strawson% and% Freeman% 2006)% is% the% best*known% contemporary% defender% of% panpsychism.% Eastern% traditions,% such% as% Buddhism,% have% always%emphasized%the%continuity%of%consciousness%across%creatures.%% Materialism,% or% its% modern% offspring,% physicalism,% has% profited% immensely% from% Galileo's% pragmatic% stance% of% removing% subjectivity% (mind)%from%nature%in%order%to%describe%and%understand%it%objectively.%% But%it%has%done%so%at%the%cost%of%failing%to%deal%with%the%central%aspect% of%reality%-%experience%itself.%Unlike%idealism,%which%does%away%with%the% physical%world,%or%dualism,%which%accepts%both%in%an%uneasy%marriage,% panpsychism% is% elegantly% unitary:% there% is% only% one% substance,% all% the% way%up%from%the%smallest%entities%to%human%consciousness%and%maybe% to%the%World%Soul%(anima&mundi).%But%panpsychism's%beauty%has%been% singularly%barren.%Besides%claiming%that%matter%and%mind%are%one%thing,% it% has% little% constructive% to% say% and% offers% no% positive% laws% explaining% how%the%mind%is%organized%and%works.%% IIT%was%not%developed%with%panpsychism%in%mind%(sic).%However,%in% line%with%the%central%intuitions%of%panpsychism,%IIT%treats%consciousness% as% an% intrinsic,% fundamental% property% of% reality.% IIT% also% implies% that% consciousness%is%graded,%that%it%is%likely%widespread%among%animals,%and% that% it%can%be%found%in%small%amounts%even%in%certain%simple%systems.% Unlike% panpsychism,% however,% IIT% clearly% implies% that% consciousness% is% not% ubiquitous.% Moreover,% IIT% offers% a% solution% to% several% of% the% conceptual% obstacles% that% panpsychists% never% properly% resolved,% like% Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%7% the% problem% of% aggregates% (or% combination% problem,% (James% 1890,% Chalmers% 2013)).% It% also% explains% why% consciousness% is% adaptive,% and% can%account%for%its%quality.% Consciousness*is*an*intrinsic*property* The% axioms% and% postulates% of% IIT% say% that% consciousness% is% an% intrinsic,% observer*independent% property% of% certain% mechanisms% in% a% state%*%how%they%shape%the%space%of%possibilities%in%their%past%and%their% future.% An% analogy% is% mass,% which% can% be% defined% by% how% it% curves% space*time%around%it.%Like%mass,%experience%cannot%be%reduced%to%more% elementary% properties.% And% like% some% elementary% particles% have% mass% or% charge% and% others% do% not,% and% if% they% have% it,% they% have% it% in% a% particular% way% (positive% or% negative% charge),% so% for% experience:% some% entities%have%it,%while%others%do%not,%and%if%they%have%it,%they%have%it%in%a% certain% way.% Except% that% in% the% case% of% experience% the% entities% having% the% property% are% not% elementary% particles,% but% complexes% of% mechanisms,% and% experience% comes% not% in% two,% but% in% a% trillion% varieties.% Thus,% for% IIT,% we% happen% to% find% ourselves% in% a% universe% in% which%experience%is%one%of%the%elementary%properties%of%certain%causal% systems.% Asking% why% this% should% be% so% or% whether% we% can% imagine% a% universe% in% which% this% is% not% true% is% akin% to% asking% why% our% universe% obeys% the% laws% of% quantum% mechanics% or% whether% we% can% image% a% universe% in% which% quantum% mechanics% does% not% hold.% In% this% general% sense,%at%least,%IIT%is%not%at%odds%with%panpsychism.% Consciousness*comes*in*various*qualities** Unfortunately,% panpsychism% is% mute% when% it% comes% to% explaining% the%way%any%one%conscious%experience%feels%*%why%the%perception%of%red% feels% different% from% that% of% blue% and% why% colors% are% experienced% as% different%from%tones.%Instead,%at%least%in%principle,%IIT%says%exactly%what% determines%the%quality%of%an%experience%-%what%makes%it%the%particular% way% it% is:% an% experience% is% identical% to% the% maximally% irreducible% conceptual% structure% (the% quale)% generated% by% a% main% complex,% in% our% case%one%made%up%by%a%set%of%neurons%in%a%particular%state.%This%is%like%a% shape,% a% constellation% in% a% fantastically% high*dimensional% qualia% space,% which% specifies% how% the% neurons% of% the% main% complex,% in% various% combinations,%give%form%to%the%space%of%possible%past%and%future%states% of%the%complex% (Fig.%4) .%Different%experiences%-%every%different%scene%in% a%movie%or%in%a%dream%*%correspond%to%different%shapes.%Except%that%this% shape,% unlike% the% shapes% of% objects,% is% the% shape% within,% the% shape% of% the% experience% itself.% It% is% the% voice% in% the% head,% the% light% inside% the% skull.%It%is%everything%I%will%ever%know%of%the%world.%It%is,%ultimately,%my% only%reality.% Consciousness*is*adaptive* IIT%takes%no%position%on%the%function%of%experience%as%such%*%similar% to% physics% not% having% anything% to% say% about% the% function% of% mass% or% charge.% However,% by% identifying% consciousness% with% integrated% information,% IIT% can% account% for% why% it% evolved,% another% aspect% about% which%panpsychism%has%nothing%to%say.%In%general,%a%brain%having%a%high% capacity%for%information%integration%will%better%match%an%environment% with% a% complex% causal% structure% varying% across% multiple% time% scales,% than% a% network% made% of% many% modules% that% are% informationally% encapsulated.% Indeed,% artificial% life% simulations% ("animats")% of% simple% Braitenberg*like%vehicles%that%have%to%traverse%mazes%and%whose%brains% evolve,% over% 60,000% generations,% by% natural% selection,% show% a% monotonic% relationship% between% (simulated)% integrated% information% and% adaptation% (Edlund,% Chaumont% et% al.% 2011 ,% Joshi,% Tononi% et% al.% 2013 .% That% is,% the% more% adapted% individual% animats% are% to% their% environment,% the% higher% the% integrated% information% of% the% main% complex%in%their%brain.%Thus,%evolution%by%natural%selection%gives%rise%to% organisms%with%high%Φ max %because%they%are%more%adept%at%exploiting% regularities%in%the%environment%than%their%less%integrated%competitors.% Consciousness*is*graded* IIT%does%side%with%the%panpsychist%intuition%that%consciousness%may% be%present%across%the%animal%kingdom,%and%even%beyond,%but%in%varying% degrees.%Everything%else%being%equal,%integrated%information,%and%with% it% the% richness% of% experience,% is% likely% to% increase% as% the% number% of% neurons% and% the% abundance% of% their% interconnections% grow,% although% sheer% number% of% neurons% is% not% a% guarantee,% as% shown% by% the% cerebellum.% It% is% also% likely% that% consciousness% is% graded% across% the% lifetime%of%any%one%organism.%In%us%it%becomes%richer%as%we%grow%from%a% baby% to% an% adult% whose% brain% has% fully% matured% and% becomes% more% functionally%specialized.%It%can%also%wax%and%wane%when%we%are%highly% alert%or%drowsy,%intoxicated%by%drugs%or%alcohol,%or%become%demented% in% old% age.% This% is% illustrated% schematically% in% Fig.% 5A ,% where% a% set% of% "cortical"% areas% are% integrated% into% a% main% complex% of% "high"% Φ max % when% the% inter*areal% connections% are% strong,% undergo% a% reduction% in% Φ max % when% connection% strength% is% reduced% by% neuromodulatory% changes% (simulated% as% an% increase% in% noise),% and% finally% breaks% down% into%small%complexes%of%low%Φ max .%% A%counterintuitive%corollary%of%IIT%is%that%even%circuits%as%simple%as%a% single%photodiode%hooked%up%to%a%1*bit%memory%can%have%a%modicum%of% experience% (Oizumi,% Albantakis% et% al.% 2014)% (see% also% Fig.% 5A ,% right% panel).% It% feels% like% something% to% be% this% circuit;% it% is% conscious% of% one% thing% -%the%distinction%between%this%and%not%this%(not%of%light%or%dark,% because%that%requires%many%more%concepts).%This%strongly%violates%our% intuitions% about% consciousness.% But% consider% that% normal% matter% at% * 272.15 o % C,% one% degree% above% absolute% zero,% still% contains% some% heat% that,% in% theory,% could% be% extracted.% However,% in% practice% its% temperature%is%as%cold%as%it%gets.%Similarly,%there%may%well%be%a%practical% threshold%for%Φ max %below%which%people%do%not%report%feeling%much%of% anything,% but% this% does% not% mean% that% consciousness% has% reached% its% absolute% zero.% Indeed,% when% we% fall% into% a% deep,% dreamless% sleep% and% don't% report% any% experience% upon% being% awoken,% our% sleeping% brain%is% still%not%fully%disconnected%and%some%complex%within%it%will%likely%have%a% Φ max % value% greater% than% zero,% yet% that% may% not% amount% to% much% compared%to%that%of%our%rich,%everyday%experience.% Aggregates*are*not*conscious* "Take%a%sentence%of%a%dozen%words,%and%take%twelve%men%and%tell%to% each%one%word.%Then%stand%the%men%in%a%row%or%jam%them%in%a%bunch,% and%let%each%think%of%his%word%as%intently%as%he%will;%nowhere%will%there% be%a%consciousness%of%the%whole%sentence."%This%is%how%William%James% illustrated%the%combination%problem%of%panpsychism%(James%1890).%%Or% take%John%Searle:%"Consciousness%cannot%spread%over%the%universe%like%a% thin% veneer% of% jam;% there% has% to% be% a% point% where% my% consciousness% ends% and% yours% begins"% (Searle% 2013).% Indeed,% if% consciousness% is% everywhere,%why%should%it%not%animate%the%United%States%of%America?% IIT% deals% squarely% with% this% problem% by% stating% that% only% maxima% of% integrated%information%count.%Consider%two%people%talking:%within%each% brain,% there% will% be% a% main% complex% -% a% set% of% neurons% that% form% a% maximally% irreducible% whole% with% definite% borders% and% a% high% value% of% Φ max .% Now% let% the% two% speak% together.% They% will% now% form% a% system% that%is%also%irreducible%(Φ%is%greater%than%zero)%due%to%their%interactions.% However,% it% is% not% maximally% irreducible,% since% its% value% of% integrated% information% will% be% much% less% than% that% of% each% of% the% two% main% complexes% it% contains.% According% to% IIT,% there% should% indeed% be% two% separate%experiences,%but%no%superordinate%conscious%entity%that%is%the% union% of% the% two.% In% other% words,% there% is% nothing% it*is*like*to*be% two% people,% let% alone% the% 300% plus% million% citizens% making% up% the% USA. xii % Again,%this%point%can%be%exemplified%schematically%by%the%system%of%Fig.% 5A,% right% panel.% While% the% five% small% complexes% do% interact,% forming% a% larger% integrated% system,% the% larger% system% is% not% a% complex:% by% the% exclusion% postulate,% only% the% five% smaller% complexes% exists,% since% they% Tononi%&%Koch%-%Consciousness%*%8% are% local% maxima% of% integrated% information% (Φ max % =% 0.19),% while% the% larger%system%is%not%a%complex%(Φ%=%0.03).%Worse,%a%dumb%thing%with%no% distinguishable%states,%say%a%grain%of%sand%for%the%sake%of%the%argument,% has%no%experience%whatsoever.%Heaping%a%large%number%of%such%zero*Φ% systems%on%top%of%each%other%would%not%increase%their%Φ%to%a%non*zero% value;%it%does%not%feel%like%anything%to%be%a%sand%dune.%Aggregates%have% no%consciousness.% Complicated*systems*can*be*unconscious* A% second% class% of% zero*Φ% systems% are% purely% feed*forward% computational%networks%in%which%one%layer%feeds%the%next%one%without% any% recurrent% connections.% According% to% IIT,% a% feed*forward% network% does%not%have%a%cause%repertoire%within%the%system%itself,%since%its%input% is% imposed% from% outside% the% system,% nor% does% it% have% an% effect% repertoire,% since% its% output% does% not% feed% back% to% any% element% within% the% network.% Yet% feed*forward% networks,% such% as% the% those% used% in% deep%learning,%perform%plenty%of%useful%computational%functions,%such% as% finding% faces% or% cats% in% images% (Le,% Ranzato% et% al.% 2011) ,% labeling% images,% reading% zip% codes% and% detecting% credit% card% fraud.% From% the% point% of% IIT,% such% networks% are% zombies,% carrying% out% tasks% unconsciously%(Koch%and%Crick%2001).% This% has% a% rather% startling% consequence.% Consider% that% any% neural% network% with% feedback% circuits% can% be% mapped% onto% a% purely% feed* forward% network% in% such% a% manner% that% the% latter% approximates% its% input*output% relationships% (for% computations% bounded% by% a% maximal% time*step;% (Hornik,% Stinchcombe% et% al.% 1989) .% That% is,% for% the% same% inputs,% the% two% networks% will% yield% the% same% output% (in% general,% the% equivalent% feed*forward% network% will% have% many% more% nodes% and% connection% than% the% feedback% network).% Therefore,% a% purely% feed* forward% system% that% were% able% to% replicate% the% input*output% behavior% of% the% human% brain% (under% the% limited% time*step% constraint),% while% behaviorally%indistinguishable%from%us,%and%certainly%capable%of%passing% the% Turing% test,% would% have% zero% Φ,% and% would% thus% be% a% "perfect"% zombie.%A%simple%example%of%two%functionally%equivalent%systems,%one% with% recurrent% connections% and% non*zero% Φ,% and% one% purely% feed* forward%with%zero%Φ,%is%show%in%Fig.%5B% (Oizumi,%Albantakis%et%al.%2014) .%% In% people% and% organisms% that% evolved% through% natural% selection,% their%input*output%behavior,%as%assessed%by%the%BCC,%offers%a%good%first% guess% about% the% presence% of% consciousness.% As% demonstrated% by% the% example% in% Fig. % 5B,% this% may% not% always% be% the% case% for% radically% different% computational% architectures.% In% the% general% case,% and% certainly%with%machines,%it%becomes%absolutely%essential%to%consider%the% internal%circuitry%-%not%just%what%the%machine%does,%but%how%it%does%so.% This% also% means% that% there% cannot% be% an% ultimate% Turing% Test% for% consciousness% (although,% there% may% be% some% practical% CAPTCHA*like% tests;%(Koch%and%Tononi%2011)).%According%to%many%functionalist%notions% (Dennett% 1993),% if% a% machine% reproduces% our% input*output% behavior% in% every%circumstance,%it%would%have%to%be%granted%consciousness%just%as% much%as%us.%IIT%could%not%disagree%more.% Simulations*of*conscious*neural*systems*can*be*unconscious* Finally,%what%about%a%computer%whose%software%simulates%in%detail% not% just% our% behavior,% but% even% the% biophysics% of% synapses,% axons,% neurons% and% so% on,% of% the% relevant% portion% of% the% human% brain% (Markram% 2006)?% Could% such% a% digital% simulacrum% ever% be% conscious?% Functionalism% again% would% say% yes,% even% more% forcefully.% For% in% this% case% all% the% relevant% interactions% within% our% brain,% not% just% our% input* output%behavior,%would%have%been%replicated%faithfully.%Why%should%we% not% grant% to% this% simulacrum% the% same% consciousness% we% grant% to% a% fellow% human?% According% to% IIT,% however,% this% would% not% be% justified,% for%the%simple%reason%that%the%brain%is%real,%but%a%simulation%of%a%brain%is% virtual% (including,% sensu& stricto,& its% simulated% value% of% Φ max ).% For% IIT,% consciousness% is% an% intrinsic% property% of% certain% systems% of% mechanisms,% one% that% requires% having% real% causal% power,% specifically% the%power%of%shaping%the%space%of%possible%past%and%future%states%in%a% maximally% irreducible% way.% In% the% same% way,% mass% is% an% intrinsic% property%of%systems%of%particles,%a%property%that%has%real%causal%power,% specifically%that%of%bending%space*time.%Therefore,%just%like%a%computer% simulation%of%a%giant%star%will%not%bend%space*time%around%the%machine,% a% simulation% of% our% conscious% brain% will% not% have% consciousness. xiii % Of% course,% the% physical% computer% that% is% running% the% simulation% is% just% as% real% as% the% brain.% However,% according% to% the% principles% of% IIT,% one% should% analyze% its% real% physical% components% *% identify% elements,% say% transistors,% define% their% cause*effect% repertoires,% find% concepts,% complexes,% and% determine% the% spatio*temporal% scale% at% which% Φ% reaches%a%maximum.%In%that%case,%we%suspect%that%the%computer%would% likely% not% form% a% large% complex% of% high% Φ max ,% but% break% down% into% many%mini*complexes%of%low%Φ max %(due%to%the%small%fan*in%and%fan*out% of% digital% circuitry,% Fig.% 5C) ,% existing% at% the% very% fast% temporal% scale% of% the%computer%clock. xiv % Conclusion* In%summary,%there%are%some%aspects%of%IIT%that%definitely%do%not%fit% with% panpsychism,% and% others% that% vindicate% some% of% its% intuitions.% In% this% respect,% it% is% natural% to% consider% how% one% should% regard% some% of% the% inferences% derived% from% IIT% for% which% it% is% hard% even% to% imagine% a% direct%test%at%the%present%time.%Our%position%is%that,%as%is%often%the%case% in%science, xv %a%theory%is%first%tested%and%validated%in%situations%that%are% close% to% ideal,% and% then% extrapolated% to% more% remote% cases.% Ideally,% whether% consciousness% varies% with% integrated% information,% and% other% predictions% of% IIT,% would% first% be% validated% here% -% on% my% own% consciousness:% for% example,% does% Φ max ,% collapse% when% I% undergo% general%anesthesia%or%a%seizure,%or%when%I%fall%into%dreamless%sleep,%and% return%to%high%values%when%I%dream?%Then%one%can%extrapolate%to%there,% at% first% in% situations% involving% other% healthy% humans,% then% in% slightly% more%difficult%cases,%say%monkeys%with%a%brain%similar%to%ours%who%are% trained%to%give%reports%similar%to%ours.%Finally,%in%so%far%as%the%theory%has% been%validated%and%has%shown%good%predictive%and%explanatory%power,% one%can%try%and%extrapolate%to%everywhere,%unresponsive%patients%with% just% a% small% "island"% of% functioning% brain% tissue,% newborn% babies,% animals% very% different% from% us,% photodiodes,% machines,% and% computer% simulations.% After% all,% often% in% science% the% best% we% can% do% is% to% draw% inferences%about%unknown%instances%based%on%a%theory%that%works%well% in% many% known% instances.% And% that% is% much% better% than% to% make% arbitrary%claims%or%to%draw%no%inference%whatsoever.% %
